ABSTRACT Vehicular social networks (VSNs) provide a variety of services for users based on social relationships through vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs). During the communication in VSNs, vehicles are at risk of exposure to privacy information. Consequently, how to guarantee the security and privacy of vehicles is a critical issue. Ring signature is an effective mechanism to achieve anonymous authentication and communication. However, how to establish rings and how to select ring members become open problems. In this paper, a privacy-preserving scheme based on the pseudonym ring in VSNs is proposed. Hierarchical network architecture and trust model are established. A series of authentication protocols are then elaborated. According to the security and performance analysis, the proposed scheme is more robust and efficient compared with the typical ones.
I. INTRODUCTION
VANETs, a special kind of ad-hoc networks, guarantee drivers or passengers on the roads to obtain continuous and stable wireless network services, like traffic congestion prediction, safe driving, as well as onboard entertainment [1] , [2] . VSNs are considered as the combination of VANETs and social networks. Based on the social relationship, users are able to get or share interesting and useful information during driving through VSNs [3] , [5] . Since all messages are sent in the form of broadcast, the adversary around a vehicle can eavesdrop the messages, which makes the communication in VSNs more vulnerable. Consequently, how to ensure the security of communication in VSNs becomes particular important. Authentication is the fundamental approach to guarantee the reliability of the entities in VSNs [6] . However, the vehicle in VSNs needs to regularly send beacon messages, that includes its current location, speed, and direction etc. [7] - [10] , which may result in privacy disclosure. Thus, the anonymous The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Feng Xia. authentication scheme comes to be the urgent need for the security of VSNs.
Currently, pseudonym certificate [12] , [13] , [29] and group signature [14] - [18] are thought as two main approaches to achieve anonymous authentication in VSNs. For the pseudonym certificate schemes, a large number of pseudonyms and certificates need to be issued by the trust authority. When participating in authentication, vehicle needs to randomly select the pseudonym and the corresponding certificate as legal identity. Nevertheless, according to [19] and [20] , each vehicle has to hold a large number of pseudonyms and certificates to fully meet the privacy requirements, which pushes great pressure on vehicles with insufficient computing and storage resources. In addition, once the vehicle is revoked, all pseudonyms and certificates should be added to the Certificate Revocation List (CRL), which is also a huge challenge for CRL's management. As a special signature mechanism, group signature is widely adopted for anonymous authentication in VSNs due to the features of nonlinkability, anonymity, and traceability. During authentication, group signature is able to prove the reliability of vehicles without exposing their identities. Meanwhile, the existence of the group manager ensures vehicle's traceability. Once the vehicle is found to be illegal, the group manager can revoke the signature and reveal the true identity of the vehicle. However, in certain scenarios, the vehicle needs to show its identity information to obtain some specific services, where group signature is hard to reach the goal.
Ring signature, as another group-oriented signature mechanism that contains the information of a group of users rather than the group manager, is applied for the authentication in VSNs [21] . Consequently, higher privacy protection is supplied. In [22] and [23] , each vehicle is allowed to generate the signature without the help of RSU or other vehicle, which provides a non-repudiation proof of the signature generated by the vehicle. However, how to generate a ring and disclose the illegal vehicles are not discussed. Identity-based ring signature [27] is deemed to be a special ring signature, where the public key of ring members is able to be efficiently generated. Reference [21] adopts such a signature mechanism to achieve vehicle's anonymity. In order to sign message, the vehicle collects the identity of the surrounding vehicles: VID and generates proof of the message by using ID-based ring signature mechanism. The verifier can verify that the signature belongs to one of the ring members, while does not know which one is. However, the non-traceability and unconditional anonymity make it difficult to revoke illegal node or provide identity-based services. Therefore, the further improvement has to be made to solve the problems.
In this paper, we propose a privacy-preserving authentication scheme based on pseudonym ring in VSNs (APPAS). We combine pseudonyms with ring signatures to make the following contributions: (1) Pseudonym is adopted as the identity of vehicle to meet the requirement of identity-based service. (2) Ring signature is applied to ensure the nonlinkability and anonymity of vehicles during authentication. (3) Pseudonym ring is designed to effectively reduce the pressure and cost of the pseudonym generation, maintenance, and revocation. (4) Roadside unit (RSU) is in charge of maintaining the ring members, which achieves the goal of traceability of illegal vehicles.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we introduce the necessary preliminaries. The proposed scheme is elaborated in section III. The security and performance analysis of the proposed scheme are given in section IV and section V respectively. Finally, we draw our conclusion in section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES A. VEHICULAR SOCIAL NETWORKS (VSNs)
As shown in Figure 1 , VSNs [3] are special VANETs that provide a variety of services to users based on social relationships. As the important part of ITS [4] , [24] , VSNs can provide relevant vehicular applications and services according to the interests and demands of vehicle users. In general, with the help of RSU, the vehicle is able to join surrounding social network and gain the useful information [11] . However, security and privacy are necessary for the communication between vehicle and RSU. Consequently, establishing the trust relationship and preserving the privacy of the communication in VSNs become crucial.
B. BILINEAR PAIRING
Let G 1 be additive cycle group, the prime order is p, and G T be multiplicative group of the same order. A bilinear pairing e: G 1 × G 1 → G T satisfies the following properties [25] . 1) Bilinear: For any P, Q ∈ G 1 , a, b ∈ Z * q , there are e(aP, bQ) = e(P, Q) ab . 2) Non-degeneracy: Existing a certain P, Q ∈ G 1 satisfies e(P, Q) = 1. 3) Computability: An efficient algorithm can calculate e(P, Q) ∈ G T , where P, Q ∈ G 1 .
C. MATHEMATICAL HARD PROBLEMS
In this paper, the following mathematical hard problems are used to ensure the security of the proposed scheme. Decision Diffie-Hellman Problem (DDHP): Given P, aP, bP, cP ∈ G 1 , where a, b, c ∈ Z * q , judging whether c = ab mod P is difficult.
Computation Diffie-Hellman Problem (CDHP): Given P, aP, bP ∈ G 1 , where a, b ∈ Z * q , it is difficult to calculate abP.
D. IDENTITY-BASED RING SIGNATURE
Ring signature is first proposed by Rivest et al. [26] . In ring signature, a set of possible signers are specified, while the verifier can not reveal which member actually generate the signature. Besides, there is no group manager in ring signature, thus each group member is indistinguishable. Generally, a standard ring signature holds the features of unconditional anonymity, unforgeability, correctness etc.. The earliest identity-based ring signature mechanism was proposed by Zhang and Kim [27] . In identity-based ring signature, the verifier only needs to know the identity information of all ring members to compute the public keys, which alleviates the management burden of the public key certificate. In addition, the verifier can not determine which one is the actual signer in a ring. Consequently, the signer's identity is well protected. However, the signers and verifiers should perform a large amount of computation, that limits the efficiency of the mechanism. Our proposed scheme borrows the idea from the ring signature scheme introduced by Chow et al. [28] , which makes a balance between the security and efficiency. The details of the scheme are as follows.
1) Setup. PKG generates public parameter param = {G 1 , G 2 , e, P, q, H, H 0 }, where H:{0,1} * → G 1 , H 0 :{0,1} * → Z * q . PKG chooses x ∈ Z * q as the master key, and the public key is P pub = xP. 2) Extract. After receiving the signer's identity ID through the secure tunnel, PKG computes the signer's public key Q ID = H(ID) and private key S ID = xQ ID . 3) Ring-sign. If a signer wants to sign message M , the following operations will be executed. a) Choose U i ∈ G 1 and compute
Ring-verify. After receiving M and σ , the verifier performs the following operations to verify the signature.
) == e(P, V ) to verify whether σ is legal.
III. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
Before introducing the proposed scheme, the relevant symbols and descriptions are shown in Table 1 . 
A. NETWORK ARCHITECTURE
As shown in Figure 2 , the whole network architecture consists of three parts. The first part is the trust authority (TA) that is responsible for generating and publishing public parameters, issuing corresponding legitimate private keys for RSUs and vehicles. Besides, TA also plays an important role in building pseudonym ring. The second part is a number of roadside units (RSUs). In the proposed scheme, RSU helps the legal vehicles to achieve anonymous communication. The last part is vehicles. Once identified as a legal node, vehicle is able to obtain corresponding network services from RSU in an anonymous way.
B. TRUST MODEL
The trust model of the proposed scheme is depicted as Figure 3 . TA, as a third party authority, is trusted by all the other entities in VSNs. Through submitting legal registration credentials, other entities and TA can build the trust relationship. Vehicles and RSUs do not trust any entities except TA. The aim of proposed scheme is to build the trust relationship among vehicles and RSUs anonymously.
C. SYSTEM INITIALIZATION
During system initialization, TA generates and publishes public parameters. The details are depicted as follows. 1) TA chooses an additive group G 1 and a multiplicative group G T of prime order q, where the generator of G 1 is P. 2) TA selects a bilinear pairing e:
q as the private key and the public key is PK TA = SK TA P. TA selects K ∈ {0, 1} * as a secret key. TA publishes the param= {G 1 , G T , e, q, P, PK TA , H 1 , H 2 , H 3 }.
D. INITIAL REGISTRATION
In this section, vehicle and RSU send the identity information to TA for registration to obtain private key or pseudonym.
1) VEHICLE REGISTRATION PROTOCOL
As shown in figure 4 , vehicle generates and sends the registration message to TA for acquiring the private key. The details are shown as following.
1) Vehicle generates the session key K v−TA ∈ {0, 1} * and the random number N 1 ∈ Z * q . The message
2) Vehicle sends C v−TA to TA. 
2) RSU REGISTRATION PROTOCOL
As shown in Figure 5 , RSU is able to obtain the private key through RSU registration protocol. 1) RSU chooses the session key K RSU−TA ∈ {0, 1} * and N 2 ∈ Z * q . RSU then encrypts the message <ID RSU , K RSU−TA , N 2 > to get ciphertext C RSU−TA = Enc_K RSU−TA {ID RSU , K RSU−TA , N 2 }. 2) RSU sends C RSU−TA to TA. 3) After receiving the ciphertext from RSU, TA uses its privacy key to decrypt C RSU−TA to get <ID RSU , K RSU−TA , N 2 >. Then TA computes the public key PK RSU = H 1 (ID RSU ) and private key SK RSU = SK TA PK RSU . TA selects n pseudonyms for the registered vehicles:
Finally, <SK RSU , N 2 + 1, PS 1−n > are encrypted to get C TA−RSU = Enc_K RSU−TA {SK RSU , N 2 + 1, PS 1−n }. 4) TA sends C TA−RSU to RSU. 5) When getting C TA−RSU , RSU decrypts C TA−RSU to obtain <SK RSU , N 2 + 1, PS 1−n >. Then RSU verifies N 2 + 1. If the verification is successful, RSU stores SK RSU , PS 1−n . Otherwise, the registration is failed. 6) As shown in Figure 6 , after successful verifying the messages from TA, RSU generates a pseudonym ring with a storage space of n, and puts the pseudonyms PS 1−n into the pseudonym ring in turn. Meanwhile, TA selects index ∈ {0, 1 . . .n − 1} randomly as a pointer. 
E. INITIAL AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL
The initial authentication protocol launches when the vehicle enters the coverage range of RSU for the first time. In the process, the vehicle and RSU use the signcryption mechanism proposed by Chen and Malonelee [32] and the signature mechanism designed by Choon and Cheon [33] respectively to achieve mutual authentication. Besides, the ciphertext and signature include key-agreement parameter, which can help communicating parties to build session key. Once the trust relationship between vehicle and RSU is established, vehicle will get the pseudonym ring. 
F. HANDOVER AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL
Taking Figure 2 as the scenario, once vehicle leaves RSU 1 accessed in the initial authentication and enters the coverage range of RSU 2 , the handover authentication protocol will be triggered. During the handover authentication, vehicle generates ring signature for authentication. RSU 2 verifies the signature anonymously. The specific process is shown in Figure 8 . is legal, then the trust relationship between RSU 2 and vehicle is built. Otherwise, handover authentication is failed. Once the vehicle's Cert is about to expire, the vehicle needs to request a new pseudonym ring from the RSU being accessed. The vehicle should send its own pseudonym PS v to RSU 2 through the secure channel. After receiving the request from vehicle, RSU 2 will execute step 7-9 in the initial authentication protocol.
G. V2V AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL
In order to build the trust relationship between vehicles (vehicle i and vehicle j ), the V2V authentication protocol is executed as Figure 9 . 
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In VSNs, the security of communication between vehicles directly affects the security of the whole network. Consequently, we first give a formal security proof of the proposed V2V authentication protocol under SVO logic [30] . As each vehicle is equipped with an OBU, vehicle is thus represented by OBU in the security proof. Afterwards, we further present some security analysis of V2V authentication protocol.
A. SVO LOGIC SVO logic [30] is a security protocol analysis measure proposed by Syverson and Orschot in 1994. It establishes a reasonable theoretical model for the logical system. In the formal semantics, some concepts are redefined and some limitations in the AT logic [31] are eliminated. The advantages of VOLUME 7, 2019 SVO are mainly embodied in the following four aspects.
• Clear semantics of modal theory are defined.
• A fairly detailed computational model is introduced.
• Excellent extensibility.
• Conciseness.
1) SYMBOLS
In order to facilitate the following security proof, the relevant notations and descriptions are given as Table 2 .
2) FORMAL DESCRIPTION
(1) Goals The main aim of this phase is to establish a trust relationship between vehicles, including achieving mutual authentication between vehicles, ensuring that the exchanging message is fresh, and establishing a shared key. Consequently, In SVO, the goal can be set as below: G 1 : OBU i believes OBU j says (ID RSU j , Cert j , N 8 , TS 6 Besides the security proof, correctness, minimum disclosure, conditional anonymity and distributed resolution authority, perfect forward privacy, and unforgeability of the authentication protocol are further analyzed.
1) CORRECTNESS
In V2V authentication, if message M is signed correctly and the signature σ is not tamper during propagation, σ must satisfy the verification equation.
2) MINIMUM DISCLOSURE
The proposed protocol executes authentication depending on a set of legal pseudonyms, there is no additional disclosure of the real identities of the entities.
3) CONDITIONAL ANONYMITY & DISTRIBUTED RESOLUTION AUTHORITY
In V2V authentication, even if the adversary can attach all ring members' pseudonyms, the probability of determining the true pseudonym of the vehicle is less than 1/m, where m is the number of the pseudonym ring members stored in vehicle. Besides, we cannot only rely on RSU or TA to identify the true identity of the vehicle. However, in some special scene, super investigator can use ID RSU and Cert to require illegal vehicle's pseudonym PS v from RSU, then TA uses k to decrypt PS v and reveal illegal vehicle's true identity. Thus, the real identity of the vehicle can be identified through the cooperation of RSU and TA.
4) PERFECT FORWARD PRIVACY
The identity of the ring member is displayed in an anonymity form and the signatures of each vehicle do not contain exactly the same members. Consequently, after the verification of a vehicle's signature, the verifier cannot reduce the probability of obtaining the true identity of the signer through the signature or message.
5) UNFORGEABILITY
Without knowing the vehicle's private key, the probability of an adversary forging a legal ring signature is negligible even though he/she is able to obtain the signature of M from a random oracle model.
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, the proposed scheme (APPAS) is compared with EDKM [18] and PACP [13] in computation cost and transmission overhead for the performance analysis. 
A. COMPUTATION COST
Computation cost refers to the total amount of computation that a vehicle needs to perform during the authentication process. Due to weak computation capabilities, vehicle's computation cost makes a great impact on the authentication efficiency. Thus, we give the comparison analysis on V2V authentication among different schemes. Before the detailed analysis, the symbol, description and execution time of some necessary operations in the schemes are shown in table 3 according to [34] . In EDKM, in order to derive the signature σ , vehicle i computes
i , and δ = αx i respectively, where r 2 and α are random numbers, <x i , A j,k i > is the group key. Then vehicle i selects random number r α , r x , r δ and generates R 1 , R 2 , R 3 , c, s α , s δ :
The signature is σ = (r 2 , T 1 , T 2 , c, s α , s x , s δ ). After receiving σ from vehicle j , vehicle i for verification should compute U = H 1 (r 2 ||M ) and V j = H 1 (r 2 g 1 ||M ). Then,R 1 ,R 2 ,R 3 are calculated:
Finally, vehicle i checks whether c == H 2 (M||r 2 ||T 1 ||T 2 ||R 1 ||R 2 ||R 3 ). If the equation holds, σ is legal. Otherwise, the authentication is failed. Consequently, we can get the computation cost in V2V of EDKM is:
In PACP, vehicle i computes its signature depending on BLS signature mechanism [37] and vehicle j verifies the signature from. Then the encryption and decryption operation are required to execute including: ,i) P) ). Besides, vehicle has to generate a signature and verify the signature from other vehicle. Since the authors do not specify the specific signature scheme, it is assumed that its signature mechanism is the BLS short signature scheme [37] . Thus, two hash-to point operations, two bilinear pairing operations, and one point multiplication operation are asked to executed. The computation cost of PACP is:
In APPAS, to sign message M , vehicle i first com- 
where m is the number of pseudonym members used in ring signature. According to (1-3), we can see that when the number of pseudonym ring member is less than 9, APPAS owns superiority in computation cost.
B. COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD
Communication overhead(CO) refers to the size of total message transmitted in V2V authentication. As EDKM and PACP do not define the content of message M, the size of message M is ignored. According to [38] and [39] , the length of the parameters is defined respectively as table 4. In EDKM, the signature is σ = (r 2 , T 1 , T 2 , c, s α , s x , s δ ), where r 2 ∈ Z * q , T 1 ∈ G 1 , T 2 ∈ G 1 , c∈ Z * q , s α ∈ G 1 , s x ∈ G 1 , s δ ∈ G 1 , σ ∈ G 1 . Consequently, the communication overhead of EDGK is:
In PACP, in order to prove the legitimacy of vehicle's identity, vehicle broadcasts PN j (a,i) = < σ 
In APPAS, the signature is σ = {∪ n i=1 {U i }, V }, where U i ∈ G 1 , V ∈ G 1 . Therefore, the communication overhead of APPAS is:
According to (4-6), we can see that when n is less than 6, APPAS owns lower communication overhead.
C. SIGNALING COST
The signaling cost refers to the amount of authentication signaling costs. In this section, the fluid-flow model [35] is adopted to analyze the signaling cost. In fluid-flow model, we suppose that all the subnets are circles with the same radius, and vehicle's movement direction is considered in the range of (0, 2π ). The crossing rate(R) and signaling cost (SC) can be defined as:
where ρ, v, L refer to vehicles' density, vehicles' average speed, and the perimeters of a cell respectively, AL means authentication latency. We sets transmission delay TD = 20ms, L = 100m, ρ = 0.1(1/m 2 ), v = 0 ∼ (40m/s), m = 1 ∼11 according to [36] . As shown in Figure 10 , we can see that APPAS owns certain advantages in signaling cost compared with other schemes when the number of pseudonym is about 7 to 9.
VI. CONCLUSION
Pseudonym and group signature are two important approaches to achieve the anonymous authentication of vehicles in VSNs. However, the mechanisms suffer from either privacy strength or efficiency. In this paper, we integrate identity-based ring signature mechanism and pseudonym to propose an effective authentication scheme, which satisfies the anonymous authentication needs in VSNs. Security and performance analysis demonstrate that the proposed scheme is robust and efficient. In the future work, a novel key management protocol will be researched in depth due to the importance of key management in VSNs. 
